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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
ITS PRESENT SCOPE AND INCREASING IMPORTANCE
By TRAcY J. PEYCKE*
A VARIETY of things have coincided in the time since the
close of the war to make the Federal Trade Commission
and its functions and possibilities matters of increasing interest
to lawyers and laymen alike. The volume of business coming
before that body has been and still is being rapidly multiplied;
the hearings on the so-called "Pittsburgh Plus" controversy have
brought the commission into the northwest in a very definite
way; and finally recent decisions of the courts' have served to
give the commission a standing which had theretofore been
challenged, and in large measure to allay the apprehensions of its
friends and advocates as to its ultimate usefulness.
It is believed that these considerations furnish sufficient rea-
son and timeliness for a discussion of a governmental agency
which seems to bid fair to become in future increasingly power-
ful and ubiquitous. The subject matter with which the Federal
Trade Commission deals is as varied and intricate as the econom-
ics of modern business. No more can be done here than to sug-
gest its outlines. The strictly legal considerations which are
necessarily involved in its operation are many and difficult, and
it is not here the purpose to discuss them all exhaustively. How-
ever, there have been only few decisions by the courts construing
the act creating the Federal Trade Commission and some of these
may fairly be examined.
In a word it is purposed to outline, for the information and
fromi the standpoint of those who do not in the course of a day's
business have generally to do with administrative commissions,
the scope of the Federal Trade Commission, its practice and
procedure, the field of substantive law with which it deals, to-
gether with a possible basis for a prediction as to its future de-
velopment and usefulness.
*Of the Minneapolis bar, President of Student Editorial Board of
MINESOTA LAw R-viw, 1920-1921.
'See particularly Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,(1922) 42 S.C.R. 150.
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The Federal Trade Commission was created by act of Con-
gress of Sept. 26, 1914.2 The Clayton Act3 was passed a few
days later, and the two acts must be construed together. Both
acts were manifestly intended to be supplementary to previous
legislation directed against trusts and monopolies restraining in-
terstate trade.4 The Bureau of Corporations had been created
by act Feb. 14, 1903,' the act creating the Department of Com-
merce and Labor. This body had carried on extensive inyestiga-
tion. The Supreme Court of United States had but a short time
before decided the Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases.6 The feel-
ing had gained strength that further legislation was necessary in
this field. The legislation of 1914 was passed upon a definite
theory and for the purpose of making effective the purpose un-
derlying the earlier legislation. The theory adopted was that
competition is an essential to be preserved.7 The function of the
Federal Trade Commission, stated in broad terms, was to be to
preserve it.
DIVIsIONS OF ACTIVITY
The Federal Trade Commission has organized its forces and
functions into three main divisions, one of which is entirely ad-
ministrative. A second is known as the legal division, and it is
with work of that division that we are here mainly concerned.
The other is the economic division. The main concern of the
legal division of the Federal Trade Commission is the enforce-
ment of section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, an
act frequently referred to as the Trade Law, and of sections two,
three, seven and eight of the Clayton Law. The economic di-
vision carries on the investigative work of the commission," which
though vast in scope is not properly of primary concern in this
article.
238 Stat. L. 717, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) Secs. 8836ff., 4 Fed. Stat.
Ann. 575.
'Act. Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. L. 730, 9 Fed. Stat. Ann. 730, U. S.
Comp. Stat. (1918) Secs. 8835 aff.4Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 40 S.C.R.
572, 64 L. Ed. 993, (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis).
'32 Stat. L. 825, 2 Fed. Stat. Ann. 475.
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 31 S.C.R. 502,
55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834. Ann. Cas. 1912D 734; American To-
bacco Co. v. United States, (1911) 221 U. S. 106, 31 S.C.R. 632, 55 L. Ed.
663.
'See report of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, June 13, 1914,
63rd Congress, Second Session, No. 597, p. 10.
- 'Secs. 6, 7 and 8.
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The functions of these divisions properly overlap, and it is
obvious that the activities of the commission occupy a field where
legal and economic principles meet and must be fused. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission inherited the propert and functions of
the Bureau of CorporationsY By section six of the Trade Law
the commission is given power to conduct investigations into the
affairs of corporations engaged in interstate and foreign com-
merce except banks and interstate carriers, both of which are
subject to investigation and control by other boards. Under this
section the commission has carried on numerous investigations,
the result of many of which have from time to time been pub-
lished in special reports. It is given express authority to make
public information so obtained "except trade secrets and names
of customers, as it shall deem expedient in the public interest."' 0
It may also require reports as to the affairs of corporations
of the class just referred to." It may on its own initiative, and
must when so required by the attorney general, investigate the
manner of carrying out a decree against a defendant corporation
under the antitrust acts.'2 Other duties in connection with these
acts may be required of the commission by other departments of
the government, 3 and other investigations of a more special
character are authorized.
When a decree is to be made against a defendant in an equity
suit under the antitrust acts, the court may refer the suit to the
commission, as a master in chancery, to report an appropriate
form of decree.14
Substantial penalties are provided for failing to make reports
required by the commission, for falsifying such reports, or for
refusing to testify or produce evidence when subpoenaed to
do so.' 5
All these investigative and advisory functions are of the same
type as those required of many administrative boards and warrant
little comment here. The act creating the commission, together
932 Stat. L. 825, 2 Fed. Stat. Ann. 475.
"'Sec. 6 (f). 'Sec. 6 (b). "Sec. 6 (c). "Sec. 6.
"Sec. 7. Districf courts declined the assistance of the commission in
this capacity in United States v. Reading Company, (1915) 226 Fed. 229,
285, and in tUniied States v. Eastman Kodak Company, (1915) 226 Fed. 62,
80-81.
"Sec. 10. ft is provided by section 9 that a person is not to be excused
from testifying or producing records for the reason that this might tend to
incriminate him, but he may not be prosecuted for anything concerning
which he may testify, except for perjury in so testifying. It will be in-
teresting to notice whether this section is given full effect.
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with the Clayton Act did, however, impose upon it duties of a
highly distinctive character. These duties are in the enforcement
of the sections of the Clayton Act heretofore referred to,'6 and
of section five of the Trade Law. The only rule of conduct con-
tained in the Trade Law is in the initial words of section five,
which provide "that unfair methods of competition in commerce
are hereby declared unlawful." The commission is then em-
powered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or cor-
porations, subject to the act, from using unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce. The remainder of section five provides
the manner in which and the machinery by which this mandate
is to be carried into effect.
Section eleven of the Clayton Act substantially re-enacts the
procedural portion of section five of the Trade Act insofar as it
is related to the duty imposed on the commission to enforce com-
pliance with sections two, three, seven and eight of the Clayton
Act. This is true with one important reservation. Whenever the
commission shall have reason to believe that a violation of section
two, three, seven or eight of the Clayton Act is involved, section
eleven of that act provides that the commission shall issue its
complaint and proceed. Whenever the commission shall have
reason to believe that a violation of the -prohibition of employing
unfair methods of competition under the Trade Law is involved,
section five of that statute provides that it shall issue its com-
plaint and proceed, only "if it shall appear to the comission that
a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of
the public."
The Federal Trade Commission Act was obviously designed
in the public interest. It lays down, as we have seen, but one rule
of conduct, namely the prohibition of "unfair methods of compe-.
tion in commerce." But this rule would seem to be intended in
protection of broad public interests; and not as a basis for the
redress of private grievances. Only the commission may insti-
tute proceedings. Private parties may be allowed to intervene,
but it was plainly not the intention of Congress that such parties
should become the prosecutors. And it is unfair methods that
are inhibited, and not unfair acts.'7 These considerations tend to
stamp this statute as one for the protection of the public, and
"Secs. 2, 3, 7, and 8.17See dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Gratz, (1920) 253 U.S. 421, 40 S.C.R. 572, at p. 576, 64 L. Ed. 993.
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
only in an incidental way as furnishing a remedy for private
wrongs. Accordingly, there is incorporated the requirement that
a proceeding should be to the interest of the public.
We are not to understand that the commission may proceed
under the Clayton Act in cases where no public interest is in-
volved. In none of its activities is the commission to be regarded
as a free legal aid bureau for corporations nursing competitive
grievances. But the practices denounced by the Clayton Act fall
under its prohibition only if they tend to substantially lessen com-
petition or create a monopoly. Such a tendency, of course, stamps
them with a public interest."'
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
The procedure and practice of the Federal Trade Commission
is regulated by the provisions of the act"0 and by the rules of
practice adopted by the commission. 20 As has been seen, all pro-
ceedings are instituted by the commission. No private individual
or corporation can institute a proceeding before that body. Here
is to be found a radical departure from the practice of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, after which the Federal Trade
Commission is largely modeled. The commission has provided
by rule, however, for filing by private parties with the commis-
sion of what is known as an application for complaint. This is
required to contain "a short and simple statement of facts," con-
stituting the alleged unfair method of competition. No docket of
applications is kept or information given of the source of the ap-
plication. The commission thus took cognizance at an early
stage of the fact that its information as to possible violations
would almost necessarily come from competitors conceiving them-
selves to be injured. Such in practice has been the case.21
The act provides that proceedings shall be initiated by the
complaint of the commission. The complaint must state the
"The requirement of public interest is not included in the Clayton
Act "presumably because such violations would per se be of interest to the
public, as distinguished from an unfair method of competition, which might
only involve a private injury." Annual report of the Federal Trade Com-
mission for the year ending June 30, 1916, p. 5.
"'Secs. 5 and 9.
"118 C.C.A. XV, 202 Fed. XIII.
'See rule II of the rules of practice of the Federal Trade Commission.
Up to June 30, 1921, 2416 applications for complaints had been filed. Of
these 1349 were dismissed without publicity. On that date 788 formal com-
plaints had been served by the commission; 379 orders to cease and de-
sist had been entered, and 101 complaints had been disposed of by orders of
discontinuance or dismissal. Annual report for 1921.
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charges of the commission,2 2 and contain notice of hearing. In
practice the formal complaint is preceded by a notice to the pros-
pective defendant and an opportunity to cease the practice com-
plained of. Very many cases are disposed of in this way: the
method of unfair competition being abandoned, it is no longer in
the interest of the public to issue a complaint. In disposing of
these and similar matters, the commission has followed the prac-
tice of the Interstate Commerce Commission of issuing "con-
ference rulings," which are published. This is also done to some
extent upon requests for advice relating to the laws the commis-
sion is empowered to enforce.
The act makes no provision for an answer by the defendant,
but the rules of practice23 of the commission have supplied such a
provision. There is no such thing as a default or an order en-
tered upon default. The orders of the commission to cease and
desist from a particular practice are enforceable only by an in-
dependent proceedings in the circuit court of appeals, and there
a decree will be entered in favor of the commission only insofar
as the order of the commission being reviewed is supported by
testimony. However, a respondent would undoubtedly be seri-
ously prejudiced in later proceedings by failure to answer. Three
copies of the answer are required to be filed,24 and the specifica-
tions as to paper, type, margins, etc., are full and minute. Neither
the law nor the rules of practice appear to contemplate any plead-
ing serving the office of a demurrer, although a motion to dismiss
may be entertained.2
The complaint cites the defendant to appear and show cause
why an order should not be entered directing it to cease and de-
sist from the violation complained of. This, of course, has never
been construed as placing an affirmative burden on the defendant,
the commission assuming the burden of proof throughout.2 6 The
act provides for intervention by any person, partnership, or cor-
poration upon good cause shown, by order of the commission.2 7 The
act appears to suggest no particular standard for determining what
2See Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 40
S. C. R. 572, 64 L. Ed. 993, infra.
'Rule III.2 Rule III.
'Fruit Growers Express Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A.,
7th Circuit, 1921) 274 Fed. 205.
'Annual report, June 30, 1916, p. 11.
'Rule V. This rule sets out in detail the specifications to be observed
in preparing this application.
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constitutes "good cause," and the rules of practice adopted by the
commission have not sought to clarify the phrase. Apparently
the matter of intervention is in the discretion of the cdmmission,
presumably divorced from the technical requirements ordinarily
associated with intervention.
The matter comes on for hearing, normally before an exam-
iner of the commission. These hearings may be held at any con-
venient place, and evidence is frequently taken in many different
cities in the same proceeding. The commission thus takes on a
more ambulatory character than is commonly the case in similar
proceedings. Depositions may be taken on order. The testi-
mony upon a proceeding is reduced to writing and filed. Objec-
tions to testimony are required to be in short form, and the
transcript contains no debate."'
The attitude of the commission toward the usual rules of
evidence seems not to be radically unlike that of an ordinary
judicial tribunal, with perhaps some relaxation, and upon hearings
one hears objections to testimony with -about the accustomed fre-
quency and upon the usual grounds. In a proceeding the findings
of the commission are conclusive only if supported by "testi-
mony." Presumably this means competent testimony, and while
we may assume that evidence is to be rather freely admitted,29 yet
the importance to a respondent of reserving his objections on the
record is apparent.3 0
When the evidence has been taken the examiner makes pro-
posed findings and a proposed order, which is served on the
parties or their attorneys. The latter then have ten days in which
to file exceptions.3 1 At the close of the hearing briefs may be
filed with the commission, twenty copies together with the proof
of service being required to be filed in such case. Oral argument
is had only as ordered by the commission.
When the matter has been fully considered the commission
may make its order requiring the respondent to cease and desist
from the practice complained of, or dismissing the complaint.
Until the record is filed with the circuit court of appeals, in the
event that there is to be a review, an order of the commission may
be modified or set aside by it at its will. Instead of a hearing, it
'Rule IX.
"Annual Report, June 30, 1916, p. 11.
"'See Harlan & McCandless, (1916). The Federal Trade Commission,




is a common practice in simple cases to make the facts upon which
any order is to be based appear by stipulation.
Like many other administrative boards the Federal Trade
Commission presents what will probably always seem an anomaly
to many lawyers in that it sits in judgment in proceedings in
which it is the complainant. In practice this possible incongruity
is mitigated by the conscious effort made by the commission to
keep the department which is actively engaged in prosecuting
complaints separated from the examiners who preside at the hear-
ings. It is easy to see that actual partizanship under these circum-
stances might largely be dissipated.
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It is noteworthy that the commission has no power of its own
for enforcing its orders. Neither the Clayton Act nor the; Trade
Commission Act provides any penalty for a failure to obey ,any
order of the commission, or for a violation of a section of which
the commission has jurisdiction. There are certain drastic pen-
alties imposed in aid of the commission's investigative powers,
but no such penalties are provided in aid of the enforcement of
section five of the Trade Law or of sections of the Clayton Act
above referred to.32
The commission can enforce'its orders only by a proceeding
in the circuit court of appeals. Whil6'with respect to the enforce-
ment of its orders the commission does not appear on paper to
be formidable,, in practice its orders are obeyed with the neces-
sity for but very infrequent resort to this judicial proceeding.33
Where the aid of the court is invoked, its jurisdiction is original,
not appellate. Where its order is not obeyed the commission may
apply to the circuit court of appeals for its enforcement, filing at
the same time the entire record of the proceeding before the com-
mission;3-4 or the party against whom an order has been made
may petition the court to set aside the order. In the latter case
also the commission is required forthwith upon being served with
a copy of such petition to file in the court a transcript of the
record. In practice either method is used. In either event the
proceedings are not de novo. Additional evidence may be ordered
2Compare the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.
'See note 47, infra.
'In a proper case the record may be condensed and the testimony put
in narrative form, in analogy with the practice under general equity rule 75,
115 C.C.A XL, 198 Fed. XL. National Harness Mfrs. Asso. v. Federal
Trade Commission, (1919) 261 Fed. 170.
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taken, but it is taken before the commission and not before the
court, and the commission may thereupon modify its findings of
fact.
It has previously been pointed out that the findings of fact
of the commission, if supported by testimony, are conclusive.
This is, of course, a familiar provision with respect to adminis-
trative boards of this kind. The court is not concluded as to the
legal effect of such findings,3" nor is the court concluded where
matter which is properly a conclusion of law is denominated a
finding of fact.36 The rule here, like that applied to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, will probably be that a mere scin-
tilla of evidence will not suffice; it will be enough, however, if
there is substantial testimony.3 7
The jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals "to enforce,
set aside, or modify orders of the commission" is exclusive. 38
Interesting attempts have been made to enjoin in district court the
prosecution of complaints by the commission. In T. C. Hurst &"
Son v. Federal Trade Commission,30 such an effort was made, the
basis of the objection being the alleged unconstitutionality of the
statute creating the commission. The court held the act valid and
denied the injunction.
The possibility of resisting the commission by injunction in a
court of equity was a question more sharply raised in suits for in-
junctions begun in the supreme court of the District of Columbia
by Butterick Co., and affiliated companies to enjoin the commis-
sion from prosecuting a complaint, which it was claimed failed to
state facts sufficient to constitute a violation of the Trade Law
or the Clayton Act. The commission resisted on the ground that the
proceeding in the circuit court of appeals prescribed in the statute
was an exclusive remedy, and that the court was without juris-
diction to enjoin the commission. The bills were dismissed and
the injunction denied.40 An appeal has been noticed by Butterick
Company.
'Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, (1915) 238 U. S. 340, 345, 35
S.C.R. 753,59 L. Ed. 337.
'Standard Oil Company v. Federal Trade Commission, (1921) 273
Fed 478.
'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. Co. et al.,
(1912) 222 U. S. 541, 547-8, 32 S.C.R. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308.
'Sec. 5.
"(190) 268 Fed. 874.
'See annual report of Federal Trade Commission, June 30, 1921, p. 26.
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PRESENT STANDING OF THE COMMISSION
The Federal Trade Commission was largely modeled after
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and it may be fair to as-
sume that the framers creating the former intended the Trade
Commission to assume a degree of power and importance com-
mensurate with that of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Trade Act and Clayton Act provide machinery which in its
larger outlines has been tested and found effective. A system of
procedure is afforded which has developed no considerable weak-
nesses in practice. In a word, we may look for the Federal Trade
Commission to become one of the major agencies of the federal
government, subject to one condition. That is that the commis-
sion should have been afforded a sufficiently ample field of sub-
stantive matter in which to function.
Sections two, three, seven and eight of the Clayton Act cover
fairly well defined practices-price discrimination, "tying" con-
tracts, intercorporate shareholding, and interlocking directorates,
under certain conditions. At this point of time it seems safe to
say that Congress in enacting the Clayton Law added somewhat
to the substantive law relating to the above mentioned practices
as contained in the antitrust acts.4' Nevertheless Congress pur-
ported to deal only with a very small group of cases, and the
activities of the commission in enforcing the Clayton Act have
not been particularly marked.
42
If that body is to be rounded into a powerful regulative
agency it will be because it has been given to it to deal with the
initial paragraph of section five of the act creating it, de-
claring "that unfair methods of competition in commerce are
hereby declared unlawful." The accurate appraisal of the scope
of the commission depends upon the meaning to be attached to
the words "unfair methods of competition." The term "com-
merce" is defined in the act, and means substantially interstate
and foreign commerce. But the term unfair methods of compe-
tition is nowhere defined. Its definition was debated by the leg-
islators and deliberately avoided. 43 The validity of this section
*'See 4 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 287.
'Of about 700 .complaints served up to the early part of 1921, 572
charged violation of section 5 of Trade Law, and 135 charged violation of
various sections of the Clayton Act. Annual report of Federal Trade
Commission, June 30, 1921.
'Report of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, June 13, 1914,
63rd Congress, Second Session, No. 597, p. 13.
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was challenged, on the score of the indefiniteness of this term, in
Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Federal Trade Commission,4 4 but
the court was not impressed with the objection. No doubt the
term is as definite as "unjust discrimination," "unreasonable re-
straint," and many other concepts perfectly familiar to all lawyers.
It is worth noting in this connection that the section does not
establish a rule of criminal liability.4
5
The meaning of the term is a question for ultimate determina-
tion by the courts and not by the commission.4  The number of
cases construing the phrase in the courts is limited, and those de-
cided by the Supreme Court is very small. The normal activi-
ties of the commission were interrupted by the war, at which time
it devoted itself largely to assisting the government's war-mak-
ing branches. For that reason the act has been slow to receive
judicial construction. It is also remarkable that the orders of
the commission have been very largely complied with without re-
view by the court.4 7 It must be assumed that business interests
generally regard the commission as a helpful agency, and are in
the main willing to cooperate with it. So long as this is true the
commission may well accomplish things not possible strictly as a
matter of powers conferred by the act.
As a result of the matters just referred to it is difficult to pre-
dict the scope which will be assigned by the courts to section five
of the Trade Law. It is quite probable that its limitations will
be marked out by a process of slow development and definition.
In the interests of a sound jurisprudence this may be most de-
sirable.
The term "unfair methods of competition" is one to which the
courts had up to the passage of the Trade Law never had occa-
sion to give a settled construction. The term "unfair competi-
tion" did have a meaning in the language of the law. It con-
sisted shortly.of representing one's products, etc., as those of an-
41(1919, C.C.A. 7th Circuit) 258 Fed. 307, 169 C.C.A. 323, 6 A.L.R. 366.
The constitutionality of the law was also unsuccessfully attacked in the
following cases: Hurst & Son v. Federal Trade Commission, (1920)' 268
Fed. 874: National Harness Mfrs. Asso. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(1920 C.C.A. 6th Court) 268 Fed. 705.
"'See 5"M.%NNESOTA LAW R'.vInW 298.
"Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 40 S.C.R.
572, 64 L. Ed. 992: Wholesale Grocers Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C.C.A. 5th Circuit 1922) 277 Fed. 657.4On June 30, 1921, the commission had made a total of 379 orders to
cease and desist. In respect to only 32 of these had there been a resort to
the court for review, and 12 of these 32 cases involved the same question
and may here be regarded as one. Annual report, June 30, 1921, p. 8.
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other of established reputation. 48  This came to be an actionable
wrong and was termed unfair competition. That it would be
within the condemnation of section five of the Trade Law if it
rose to the dignity of a "method" can hardly be doubted. It will
be seen, however, that common law definitions have not proved
of very material assistance.
Since the enactment of the Federal Antitrust Acts the courts
have fallen into the habit of speaking of numerous other prac-
tices as "unfair competition." 49 Economic writers had previous
to the creation of the Federal Trade Commission taken an inter-
est in the subject and had cataloged numerous business prac-
tices as "unfair competition." 50  As has been pointed out the
scope of this term is for the courts, and they have as yet hardly
begun its consideration.. The commission considers it the first in-
stance, however, and there the term has been many times con-
strued. In determining whether a method of competition is un-
fair the commission has recourse to all the available -sources of
information,--legal, economic, or of whatever character.51 In
the annual report of the commission for 192052 three classes of
cases are recognized. The first includes those practices which
involve an element of moral turpitude. The second embraces
practices which were condemned at common law. The third class
represents -a rather miscellaneous group which had at that time
been developed by the experience of the commission. In the
same report53 are listed numerous specific methods of competi-
tion which had been condemned by orders of the commission in
particular cases.
The question must ultimately be settled by the courts, and it
is to their decisions that we must finally look. One of the earliest
cases to construe the Federal Trade Law was Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz.5- The commission had there entered a
cease and desist order directed against the practice of respondents
of refusing to sell cotton bagging to customers unless the latter
would take a corresponding quantity of ties. This order was re-
'*Rathbone, Sard & Co. v. Champion Steel Range Co., (1911) 189 Fed.
26, 110 C.C.A. 596.
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States. (1911) 221 U. S 1. 31 S.C.R. 502.
509, 55 L. Ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, Ann. Cas. 1912D 734.
'See W. S. Stevens, Unfair Competition, 29 Pol. Sc. Q. 284-306 and
463-485.
"
1Annual report, June 30, 1916, p. 6.52P. 48.
11P. 56 ff.
1(1919 C.C.A. 2nd Circuit) 258 Fed. 314, 169 C.C.A. 330, 11 A.L.R. 793.
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versed. The court found that there was no evidence of a general
practice to refuse to sell bagging without ties, and held the com-
mission had no jurisdiction of individual grievances. The court
declared:
"It seems to us that unfair methods of competition between
individuals are not contemplated by the act." 5 "We think the un-
fair methods, though not restricted to such as violate the anti-
trust act, must be at least such as are unfair to the public gen-
erally."P5 8
The case went to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and was there disposed of on the narrow ground that the com-
plaint of the commission failed to state facts sufficient to consti-
tute a violation of section five of the Trade Law.57 The court
pointed out that the complaint failed to allege that either the pub-
lic or any competitor suffered from the practice complained of.
The court said:
"If, when liberally construed, the complaint is plainly insuffi-
cient to show unfair competition within the proper meaning of
these words there is no foundation for an order to desist-the
thing which may be prohibited is the method of competition speci-
fied in the complaint. Such an order should follow the com-
plaint; otherwise it is improvident and, when challenged, will be
annulled by the court."58
The objection to the complaint was raised for the first time
in the Supreme Court and was not taken by counsel at all.
Justice Brandeis, Justice Clarke concurring, dissented upon the
ground among others that it was contrary to ordinary practice to
dispose of -the case under these circumstances upon a question of
pleading.
Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Federal Trade Commission"
appeared at about the same time. The complaint there charged
that respondent falsely advertised that it had sources for secur-
ing certain of its goods not enjoyed by competitors; that it pur-
chased teas, etc., only after inspection had been made on the
ground by its own expert. The complaint further charged that
respondent sold sugar at a loss. An order was entered to cease
" (1919) 258 Fed. 314, 316.
'(1919) 258 Fed. 314, 317. See also as supporting this view New Jer-
sey Asbestos Company v. Federal Trade Commission, (1920 C.C.A. 2nd
Circuit) 264 Fed. 509; Kinney Rome Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C.C.A. 7th circuit 1921), 275 Fed. 665.
'(1920) 253 U. S. 421, 40 S.C.R. 572, 64 L. Ed. 993.
"(1920) 40 S.C.R. 572, 574-575, 64 L. Ed. 993.
'(C.C.A. 7th Circuit 1919), 258 Fed. 307, 169 C.C.A. 323, 6 A.L.R. 366
and note.
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and desist from these practices. The court affirmed the order
with the exception of the item of selling at less than cost, a
practice which standing alone the court declined to condemn. The
court took occasion to say, "The commissioners are not required
to aver and prove that any competitor has been damaged or that
any purchaser has been deceived." 0
The case of Winsted Hosiery Company v. Federal Trade
Commission," as decided by the circuit court of appeals, fur-
nished an interesting contrast to the view taken in the Sears, Roe-
buck & Company Case. In the Winsted Hosiery Company Case
the order was to cease and desist from a practice of marking and
branding shirts as "wool," "natural wool," etc., when in fact but
a small amount of wool was present. It was in evidence that this
system had been a trade practice for the past twenty years, and
that the trade was familiar with it and was not misled by it. The
order of the commission was reversed. The court remarked, "the
commission is not made a censor of commercial morals gen-
erally." As against any other manufacturer or any competitor
of respondent, no unfair method was employed. If a consumer
was misled, the court was of opinion that this had nothing to do
with "unfair competition. " ' 2
The doctrine of this case apparently was that a business
method will not be interfered with unless it is unfair to a competi-
tor. Standing alone the term "unfair methods of competition"
might easily bear this construction. 63 As we have seen, however,
Congress was grappling with the large problem of business regu-
lation, and opinion was divided between those who favored reg-
ulated monopoly and those who advocated competition as a suf-
ficient remedy but who conceded that its regulation was neces-
sary. That such regulation was deemed necessary primarily in
the public interest can hardly be doubted. If any doubt should
exist, it ought largely to be dispelled by the requirement, as a
condition precedent to any action by the commission to prevent
'258 Fed. 307, 311. See unfavorable comment on this case in 88 Cent.
Law J. 425, where it is pointed out that false advertising .is not unlawful at
common law unless someone is deceived. And compare Winsted Hosiery
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (1921 C.C.A. 2nd Circuit) 272 Fed. 957,
infra.41(1921 C.C.A. 2nd Circuit) 272 Fed. 957.
"See adverse comment on this case in 20 Mich. Law Review 122-123.
Certiorari in this case was granted by the Supreme Court. 255 U. S.- ,
41 S.C.R. 625, 65 L. Ed. 735.
"Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Gratz, (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 40 S.C.R. 572, 577, 64 L. Ed. 993.
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"unfair methods of competition," that such action be "to the in-
terest of the public."
The Winsted Case was brought to the Supreme Court on writ
of certiorari, and an opinion was there handed down on Apr. 24,
1922, reversing the decree of the circuit court of appeals." Mr.
Justice Brandeis wrote the unanimous decision of the court. The
court held that the findings of the commission were supported by
the evidence. The commission found that the labels employed
deceived a large part of the buying public; and that the method
was unfair to competitprs in that the Winsted Co. was enabled
thereby to get orders which would otherwise have gone to manu-
facturers of similarly branded articles which were genuine. An
element of wrongdoing was found by the court in the fact that
unscrupulous retailers were by this method supplied with a means
of fraud.
The decision of the Supreme Court clearly proceeds upon
the finding that honest competitors of the Wihsted Co. were ad-
versely affected by the practice. The circuit court of appeals had
declared: "In this case there was obviously no unfair method of
competition as against other manufacturers of underwear." 6"' The
Supreme Court regarding the contrary finding of the commission,
insofar as it represented a finding of fact, as supported by the
evidence. Competitors were in fact no doubt damaged by the
practice of the Winsted Co.
Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade Commission',
was a case in which the commission had issued an order against
a certain plan of advertising by the Royal Baking Powder Co.
the petitioner. This corporation, with its constituent companies,
had according to the findings of the commission, been engaged
for many years in making and selling a high grade cream of tar-
tar baking powder. It ceased to manufacture this and in place
thereof put out a phosphate powder, which was much less expen-
sive. The containers remained very similar to those formerly
used. Both powders were sold under the brand "Dr. Price's
Baking Powder." It was advertised that the price of this brand
had been reduced. The order of the commission in a general way
prohibited these practices and required that the new powder be
plainly designated as a phosphate powder.
3 Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., (1922) 42 S.C.R.384.
" (1921) 272 Fed. 957, 960.
" (1922 C.C.A. 2nd Circuit) 281 Fed. 744.
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The Supreme Court decision in the Winsted Hosiery Co. Case
was strongly relied on by the court in affirming the order of the
commission, and is cited as supporting the proposition that the
commission has power to prevent the misrepresentation of the
quality of the goods of a manufacturer in his aavertising. It is
interesting to notice that the practice condemned in the Royal
Baking Powder Co. Case is that of representing one product of
a manufacturer as being another and in fact different product of
the same manufacturer.
The two cases last cited clearly go far to support the exercise
of power by the Federal Trade Commission to prevent misbrand-
ing of goods and misleading advertising.
The- case which is perhaps most important in defining the
powers of the commission is that of Federal Trade Commission
v. Beech-Nut Packing Company,67 recently decided by the Su-
preme Court. The order of the commission in that case was
directed against the so called Beech-Nut system of merchandising.
It was found as facts by the commission or appeared by stipula-
tion that this system was employed by respondent and consisted
briefly in refusing to sell to jobbers and wholesalers who in turn
sold to retailers not observing the "suggested" prices. Such
jobbers and wholesalers were subject to be reported to respond-
ent by its agents or other dealers, and distributors not maintain-
ing the indicated resale prices were listed and remained in dis-
favor until they could give satisfactory assurances of future
compliance with the company's schedule of prices. This system
was not maintained by contract, but by the practice and the tacit
understandings indicated above.
The circuit court of appeals reversed the order of the com-
mission.68 This was done upon the authority of United States v.
Colgate & Company,6" which the court considered as controlling
and as establishing the proposition that a manufacturer might re-
fuse to sell at his choice so long as there was no contract, express
or implied, effecting a combination.
The decision of the circuit court of appeals was reversed by the
Supreme Court. It was pointed out that the Colgate Case arose
under the Sherman Act while the proceeding in the instant case
-'(1922) 42 S.C.R. 150, 19 A.L.R. 882.
"Beech -Nut Packing Company v. Federal Trade Commission, (1920)
264 Fed. 885.
'(1919) 250 U. S. 300, 39 S.C.R. 465, 63 L. Ed. 992, 7 A.L.R. 443.
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was under section five of the Trade Law. It was not regarded
by the court as essential that a contract be established. The court
remarked:
"The specific facts found show suppression of the freedom
of competition by methods in which the company secures the
cooperation of its distributors and customers, which are quite
as effectual as agreements express or implied intended to ac-
complish the same purpose.17
0
Competition among retailers was substantially restricted by
the Beech-Nut system. As bearing upon the scope to be given
the term "unfair methods of competition" the court said:
"If the 'Beech-Nut system of merchandising' is against
public policy, because of its dangerous tendency unduly to
hinder competition or to create a monopoly, it is within the
power of the Commission to make an order forbidding its con-
tinuation."
7 1
Justice Holmes, McKenna, Brandeis, and McReynolds dis-
sented. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion the pur-
port of which may fairly be summed up in his remark: "to
whom respondent's conduct is unfair I do not see."' 72 The re-
spondent already had a monopoly of its own goods. It was
argued that the competition referred to is competition among the
doers of the condemned act. In rejecting this view the Supreme
Court has substantially broadened the meaning and force of
section five of the Trade Law. In rejecting the view that the
method of competition complained of must be one unfair to a
competitor of respondent the court has likewise materially added
to the power and effectiveness of the Federal Trade Commission.
If the principle involved in the Beech-Nut Case is to be followed
to its logical conclusion. it means that a method of competition
falls within the ban of the act if it is unfair to the public, regard-
less of whether it is or is not unfair to a competitor of respondent
and regardless of whether it is unfair to any individual in the
trade. This decision strengthens the hand of the Federal Trade
Commission, and may result in making that body -the medium
through which we may expect to be made whatever substantial
progress is possible for a considerable time to come in the regu-
lation of interstate business.
'(1922) 42 S.C.R. 150, 155.
t(1922) 42 S.C.R. 150,154.
"2(1922) 42 S.C.R. 150, 156.
See Standard Oil v, Federal Trade Com. (1922), 282 Fed. 81.
